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Abstract
The impact of the Gamal Abdul Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal on
Anthony Eden’s policy making during the Suez Crisis is the bases of this research. Using
data from the Cabinet records of Eden’s Egypt Committee, this research will demonstrate
that Eden and the Egypt Committee acted irrationally during the Suez Crisis and by doing
so created a schism in the Atlantic Alliance. This rift would force President Dwight
Eisenhower to side with the Soviet Union against Britain to resolve the conflict. The
effects of the crisis caused the British to lose their prestige as a world power and later, to
withdrawal from the Middle East.
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Introduction

I believe it is essential in the highest interest... that Britain should at all hazards maintain
her prestige among the Great Powers of the world... if a situation were to be forced upon
us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficient
position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to
be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the
Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation
intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.

David Lloyd George
Mansion House speech of 19111

The evening after Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez
Canal on July 27, Prime Minister Anthony Eden decided to form a war cabinet to deal
with the crisis. This decision-making body was christened the Egypt Committee (EC) and
would come to optimize the predicament of Britain’s changed role in the world. The EC
consisted of the most senior ministers in Eden’s Cabinet: the Marquess of Salisbury, Lord
President of the Council; Harold Macmillan, Chancellor of the Exchequer; the Earl of
Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations; Sir Walter Monckton, Minster of
Defense; and Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Relations.2 Since its
conception on that Friday evening, the EC became the most influential element on
Anthony Eden’s decision-making and set a course of action that came to embody Eden’s
government during the Suez Crisis. From July 30 through November 4, the EC decided to
follow the truculent policy of Nasser’s destruction. Eden’s government thought that
Nasser’s removal from power was the panacea to Britain’s decline. Since Nasser’s rise to
power, they saw him devouring Britain’s authority throughout the Near East. First, it
began with his opposition to the Baghdad Pact.3 Then, the EC saw his ubiquitous hand in
General Glubb’s dismissal. In making their decisions within the EC, members of that
1

decision-making body demonstrated the flawed policy of “group think,” which removed
the possibility of individual choice.4 This group thinking led Eden to make irrational
decisions that were based on the EC’s fixed sensation with getting rid of Nasser at all cost
and eventually would lead to the downfall of Eden’s government. Another consequence
of the EC’s group think decision making was the end of Britain’s influence in the Middle
East. Furthermore, the EC’s decision to use force in the early days of the Suez Crisis was
based on Britain’s reputation among Arab countries. To the members of the EC, Britain’s
standing and prestige as a great power was threatened by a third-rate power—mainly
Nasser’s Egypt. Based on that assumption, the EC did not want to save the Suez Canal
from Nasser, but wanted to save British prestige from Nasser’s challenge to Britain’s
presence in the Middle East. Undeniably, the EC sought American support for the use of
force to save Britain’s reputation in the region. When this failed, the EC then tried to buy
time under the veil of seeking a peaceful resolution to the crisis through negotiation,
while simultaneously Britain gathered the necessary resources for the invasion of Egypt.
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Eden, the Egypt Committee and Nasser
Anthony Eden is usually seen as the omnipotent hand that drove Britain over the
edge during the Suez Crisis, but even though the final decision to go ahead with the
operation was his, the influence and pressure he faced from EC, no doubt, led him to take
that final step. To understand Eden’s decision-making during the Suez Crisis, it is
necessary to grasp the burden of his position. He faced a number of obstacles during the
crisis that led to poor decision-making. In addition, the obligation to act in order to
maintain Britain’s influence and prestige in the Near East clouded Eden’s judgment
forcing him to make irrational decisions; however, he did not make these choices alone.
The EC aided Eden with the war planning and policymaking during the Suez Crisis. In
the early hours of the crisis, the world was clearly behind Britain and against Nasser’s
unjustified seizure of the Canal. Ostensibly, even Nehru and Tito, Nasser’s allies,
opposed Nasser’s blatant act.5 The EC was not pliant to the situation and its lack of
dexterity would turn world opinion against Britain; forces both within and without Eden’s
government drove these incongruous decisions. The dynamics behind this irrational
behavior was the maintenance of Britain’s Great Power standing.
Anthony Eden, as Foreign Minister, negotiated the base withdrawal from the “the
swinging-door of the British Empire” because the toll on Britain’s resources was both
economically and militarily too great to endure. Raids against British positions in the
Canal Zone and rioting in Ismailia led to a change of policy towards King Farouk.6 When
the July 23, coup removed Farouk from power, Churchill did not raise a finger to help.
The British hoped that the new Egyptian government would help solidify their position in
the Canal Zone and help maintain Britain’s influence, but for Nasser and the Free
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Officers conformity with the British was the last thing on their minds.7 When they
demanded that the British withdraw from the Canal Zone in 1953, The U.S. encouraged
Prime Minster Churchill to relinquish control. Eden and Churchill both agreed that
80,000 troops in the Suez Canal Zone were draining the UK’s resources, yet Churchill
remained reluctant to let go of the imperial past. As Eden insisted that Britain could not
maintain a base in Egypt indefinitely and a new strategy was needed to guarantee
Britain’s oil interests, the Suez Group arose in opposition to Eden and his policy. The
Suez Group presented their own solution to the problem calling it the “Waterhouse
Theory” after Captain Charles Waterhouse. According to Waterhouse, a minimal of
10,000 troops were needed to hold the base indefinitely.8 They accused Eden of removing
a deterrent that Britain needed to uphold in order to sustain the Commonwealth and keep
Middle Eastern rulers in line. Despite the Suez Groups ranting and Churchill’s reluctance,
Eden pushed through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in February of 1953, which said that
Britain would leave the Canal Zone in its entirety by June of 1956.
With the withdrawal from the Suez Canal a foregone conclusion, Britain needed
to secure its oil interests by other means. Since 1953, Britain tried to form a defensive
pact in the Middle East around its principle allies, mainly Iraq and Jordan, in the region.
With the shift in focus from India to the Near East, Britain pursued a defensive pact to
maintain its Near East possession and keep the Soviet Union out of the region.9 The
plan’s dual purpose was to prevent the Soviet Union from spreading into the region and
help maintain Britain’s influence. Without British involvement, Turkey and Iraq signed
the Turco-Iraqi Pact in February of 1955. The British joined shortly after the formation of
the pact and decided that this would provide protection against Communist incursion
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while helping maintain their presence in the Near East.10 The U.S. promoted the Baghdad
Pact, but refused to join. In addition, the U.S. recommendations to Britain to remain out
of the agreement were largely ignored.11 Egypt too would not join and oppose the
Baghdad Pact because Nasser saw the agreement diminishing his role in the Arab World
and increasing Iraqi’s. He also suspected the defense agreement was Britain’s attempt to
reestablish her hegemony in the region.12 When, in December of 1955, King Hussein of
Jordan refused to join the Baghdad Pact, Eden blamed Nasser and Cairo radio’s Voice of
the Arabs.
The next blow to Britain’s position came when King Hussein dismissed General
Glubb, commander of the Arab Legion in Jordan, in March of 1955. Again, Eden blamed
Nasser. The use of the airwaves by the Voice of the Arabs ridiculed King Hussein as a
stooge of Glubb. Perhaps this did put pressure on Hussein to remove Glubb, but the final
decision was the King’s. Nevertheless, Eden blamed Nasser of having total control over
Glubb’s dismissal.13 The General’s banishment would frustrate Eden’s vision for a
regional defense pact for the Middle East and in turn, he would rage that he wanted
Nasser immediately “destroyed.”14 Julian Amery of the Suez Group wrote in the Times
that this was the, “bankruptcy of the policy of appeasement in the Middle East…we are
now very close to the final disaster.” 15
Wanting to sustain stability in the Middle East in order to continue the
unhampered flow of oil to Europe, the U.S. and Great Britain decided that stability to the
region would come in the form of peace. In order to do this, they decided on a lasting
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, this would lead to a defensive pact that
would resolve future disputes and keep Soviet Russia out of the region.16
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When Nasser announced the Aswan Dam project in the fall of 1955, the U.S. and
U.K saw a chance to appease Nasser by funding the dam. This ran parallel to their policy
of maintaining stability in the region and the vanguard of this policy now was Nasser.
However, Nasser would not adhere to this strategy. In the spring of 1956, Nasser
inflamed the West by recognizing Red China and then, in September of that year he
completed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia. To the U.S. and Great Britain, it seemed
that Nasser was allowing the Communist into the Near East and defying their policy.
This, along with domestic concerns in the U.S., caused Eisenhower to withdraw support
for the Aswan Dam project. Eden wrote to Eisenhower explaining that Nasser wanted to
unite the Arabs under a federal system run from Cairo, the ultimate aim of which was a
socialist system under Russian influence.17 Nasser felt that the dam would cure Egypt’s
financial woes and drive Egypt’s industry into a gold age of economic prosperity.18
When the final phase of British troops left the Suez Canal, in accordance with the
Anglo-Egyptian agreement, on June 14, 1956, five days later the U.S. withdrew support
and funding for the Aswan Dam. Furiously, Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal
on the evening of July 26, 1956. That night Eden was having an honorary dinner for the
King of Iraq with Iraqi Prime Minster Nuri es-Said when the news of Nasser’s decision
came.19 The months of appeasement, Eden felt, had culminated into this. As Nuri told
Eden to be as forceful as possible and act early, Eden felt the pressure to respond almost
immediately.20 What would the Third World think if Britain allowed Nasser to get away
with this action? “I had no doubt how Nasser’s deed would be read,” Eden later said,
“from Agadir [Morocco] to Karachi. This was a seizure of Western property…on its
outcome would depend whose authority would prevail.” 21
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Hours upon hearing the news of Nasser’s nationalization, Eden convened an
impromptu meeting in the Cabinet Room at Number 10 Downing Street.22 Present were
Selwyn Lloyd, Lord Salisbury, Lord Home, Viscount Kilmer, Earl Mountbatten of
Burma, Sir Gerald Templer, Sir Edward Boyle, Jean Chauvel, the French Ambassador,
and Andrew Foster, the American Chargé d’Affaires.23 Eden spoke first stating the
importance of the canal to the West and the economic chaos that would follow if Nasser
were allowed to “get away with it.” Feeling he could not stand idle and watch Nasser eat
away at British influence in the region, the time for appeasement, Eden felt, was over and
action had to be taken before Nasser became too powerful. He went on emphasizing the
importance of the canal declaring that, “The Egyptian has his thumb on our
windpipe…this is the end. We can’t put up with any more of this…our whole position
demands strong action.” When informed that legally Nasser has done nothing wrong,
Eden raged, “I don’t care whether it’s illegal or not, I’m not going to let him do it. He’s
not going to get away with it.”24 He then turned to Mountbatten and asked what the
military could do in response to Nasser’s action. The First Sea Lord told Eden that the
Mediterranean Fleet could be ready to set sail the next morning and commando
reinforcements from Cyprus would join the fleet. A surprise invasion of Port Said would
then be mounted and the port city could be held. However, taking the entire Canal was
impossible with the troops available and the initial invasion would have to be reinforced
soon or the whole effort would be futile.25
That evening, Andrew Foster’s cable Washington to inform Eisenhower that the
meeting was emotional and Eden expressed that immediate action might be the only
solution. The British, Foster said, did not think it prudent to refer the matter to the United
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Nations because that course would delay the matter.26 Here, it seemed that Eden had a
grasp of the situation. He knew that time was not on Britain’s side and delayed action
would only benefit Nasser. The longer the situation was allowed to linger, the less likely
it was that force would be used. Nevertheless, Even if Eden wanted to act, contingency
plans were not in effect.
That same night, Eden ordered Lord Mountbatten to stay up all night to prepare
plans for a full-scale attack to retake the canal; however, the military was not prepared for
such action and training for the special operation was needed. This call for immediate
action caused the Chiefs to threat Eden with resignation.27 Harold Macmillan best
summoned up the difficulty of the matter: “The truth is that we are caught in a terrible
dilemma. If we take strong action against Egypt, and as a result the Canal is closed, the
pipelines to the Levant are cut…oil production is stopped…if we suffer a diplomatic
defeat…we have equally ‘had it.’ What then do we do?”28 In addition to Macmillan’s
anxiety, Lloyd, equally if not more anxiously, summed the crisis as three months of
extreme pressure, “each time as soon as success seemed in sight something happened to
frustrate us. It was like walking up a mountain. Each time one gets to the crest of a hill it
is only to find out that there is yet another one beyond it.”29
Since the Soviet Union would veto any resolution presented to the U.N., the
Cabinet agreed that U.N. action would not be prudent at the moment. The Cabinet gave
careful thought for the economic option, but decided this needed time to take its toll on
Nasser and they did not want to drag the situation for months. This option did not play
into Eden’s plan for a quick response to Nasser and other than agreeing to reverse

8

Nasser’s act, no coherent course of action was decided that night. The meeting ended
with Eden instructing the Chiefs of Staff to produce a military plan to take the canal.
The question of whether Eden was willing to go in alone all depended on Britain’s
means to carryout a military attack. Had the British the means to unleash an attack, Eden
would have gone in and invaded Egypt, but there was a dearth in transport as Eden later
confirmed when he stressed that, “Unless action could have been carried through
exclusively by airborne troops, there was no alternative to an expedition from Malta.
Unless we could fly all the forces needed, they had to swim.”30 The Suez Group blamed
Eden for the lack of troops in the region. From Eden’s point of view, Nasser was to
blame; had he not adamantly opposed Britain at every effort made or allowed the
Baghdad Pact to materialize, Britain could have had a regional rapid reaction force to
protect Britain’s assets.
The next morning, with the British Press demanding action, Eden telephoned
Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and briefed him in on the events of
the night before.31 At eleven o’clock in the morning, Eden addressed the House of
Commons. The leader of the Labour Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell condemned the
Egyptian action and other Labor leaders stood up to denounce Nasser. With the majority
of British Press—the Guardian being the exception and urging restraint—arguing that a
strong line should be taken against Nasser, Eden and his colleagues were under the
impression that the nation was behind any action they planned against Egypt; however,
by mid-September, these feelings by Parliament and the British public would change.32
That Friday morning, the Cabinet faced the predicament of what sort of response
to Nasser’s action Britain could take. The Bank of England was given the authority to
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hold Egypt’s sterling reserves, the assets of the Suez Canal Company in London were
protected, British subjects living in Egypt were warned to leave, and four Egyptian naval
vessels anchored in British waters were delayed, “short of physical interference,” from
leaving.”33 The Cabinet also learned that Nasser had told the Ottoman Bank to turn over
the Suez Canal Company’s assets worth about £2 million.34 Mountbatten suggested that
no move should be made that would seem threatening to Egypt. Eden was reminded that
Nasser had not broken any international laws. The Suez Canal was registered as Egyptian
and, therefore, subject to Egyptian law. Moreover, Nasser announced that he would
compensate the Canal shareholders. The Cabinet decided to use the counter argument that
the canal was not Egyptian property, but an international entity subject to international
law. Eden felt that Britain could deny Egypt’s legitimacy by arguing the international role
of the Canal, but this pitfall would place Britain in a morass of conferences and prolong
the crisis for months—a situation that Britain wanted to avoid. Indeed Eden became so
infatuated with this idea he would later say that, “Failure to keep the canal international
would inevitably lead to the loss one by one of all our interest and assets in the Middle
East.”35
At this point, it is hard to determine if Eden still felt the same way about the
military option as he did the night before. He did order the Chiefs of Staff to prepare a
plan for the invasion of Egypt and the occupation of the canal.36 In his memoirs Full
Circle, Eden stated that force would only be used as a last resort, but in his letter to
Eisenhower, after the Cabinet meeting, he stated that they could “not allow Nasser to
seize the Canal” and needed to act quickly or “our influence and yours throughout the
Middle East will…be irretrievably undermined.”37
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As early as March of 1956, MI6 reports on Nasser’s intentions proved to Eden
that Nasser wanted more. The reports originated from an Egyptian agent within the
Nasser’s government and predicted that Nasser was working to overthrow the
governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and Iraq while simultaneously replacing
them with puppet regimes that were loyal to him. The end result of all this would be the
establishment of the “United Arab States” with no borders, customs, and one economic
system. The intelligence abstracts added that this policy had received the full backing of
the Soviet Union.38
On the evening of July 26, the Cabinet decided to form the Egypt Committee.
From this point forward, Eden would use the EC and not the full Cabinet to make
decisions concerning the conflict. Indeed, during the crisis, the full Cabinet would not
meet as often as it had in the past, and the EC would become the main crisis management
body.
Precisely at seven in the evening, the next day the EC held its first meeting.
Present at this meeting were Eden, Macmillan, Home, Lloyd, Watkinson, and Monckton.
This was the core group of the EC. At certain periods, during the conflict, other Ministers
would join to add their specialized interests to the discussion. At the moment, for Eden
and his colleagues, Nasser’s nationalization raised the question of canal dues. Macmillan
told the EC that two problems had to be resolved on this matter. The first involved the
question of where to pay the canal dues, the second raised the issue of controlling the
assets held by the Suez Canal Company (SCC). As to the payment of canal dues, they
decided that British and French ship-owners would continue to pay their dues to the SCC
offices in London and Paris respectfully. The U.S. and other countries would have to pay
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the dues to Cairo for the time being. Britain’s diminished role in world affairs became
apparent when Eden asked Home what the Commonwealth could provide in military
assistance.39
British employees that worked for the SCC presented a dilemma for the EC. Two
choices were presented to the EC that evening: one, the employees could walk off the
job, or two they could continue to work for the new administration. The problem with the
first was that by walking off the EC feared that the Canal would be shutdown and this
would hamper oil supplies. The second choice was equally discouraging, for if they
allowed the employees to stay, Britain would be condoning Nasser’s action. The EC
decided that the normal function of the Canal outweighed concern for Nasser’s action and
voted to keep the employees working.40
Before the next EC meeting was held, Eden sent Eisenhower a message to inform
him that Nasser threatened Western oil supplies and economic sanctions alone would not
work without a show of force.41 On Saturday July 28, Eden informed the EC that
Eisenhower favored tripartite talks between the U.S, France, and the U.K., but did not
support military action at this time. The Chiefs of Staff told the EC that Army reservists
would have to be recalled, but this would raise suspicion that the Her Majesties
Government (HMG) was preparing for war.42 Eden told the Chiefs to present at the next
EC meeting a number of military options that would conceal military preparations from
the press and public.43 Macmillan then proposed that Britain seek Israel’s assistance to
help with the military action against Nasser. But Eden refused his advice, stating that this
would alienate Britain’s allies in the Middle East. 44
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As the second day of the crisis passed, the EC had not yet chosen a definitive
course of action. The members knew that Egypt could not be allowed to continue its
collection of Canal dues, so they had to find a solution to this problem. They decided to
mobilize the military, but did not have the transports available; the paratroopers needed
were bogged down in a guerilla war in Cyprus. That afternoon, Eden found the time to go
to Wiltshire, but remained in touch with London.45 He left Lloyd to meet with Robert
Murphy, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, and Christian Pineau, the French Foreign
Minster.
Lloyd met with Pineau before he met Murphy on July 29 and told him that the
U.S. was hesitating when it came to military action and that they would probably seek an
international conference. Lloyd went on to state that it would be wise to go along with the
Americans until Britain and France were prepared militarily.46 The Foreign Minster only
mentioned in his memoirs that he met Pineau a few minutes before he met Murphy and
that Pineau had told him that the French were willing to go, “to the end in dealing with
Nasser.” Lloyd informed the French Foreign Minster that the British Chiefs of Staff
would have a plan ready by July 31.47
The other difficulties that added to Eden’s anxiety for a quick solution to the crisis
were the number of reservists available to Britain and inner workings of shipping dues.
As for the oil reserves, it was estimated that 60-70 percent of Britain’s oil passed through
the canal and that reserves would only last six weeks if that route were cutoff.48 This is
what made the canal vital to Britain’s survival and now it was in Nasser’s hands. Eden
made it clear to the Russians that the supply of oil was so essential to Britain that they
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“would fight for it” if need be. To add to his torment, Eden learned that financial reserves
would only cover three months of imports.49
Upon his return to London, Eden updated the House of Commons on the financial
decisions his government had made against Egypt. He stated his intention that day that
“no arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable
to Her Majesty’s Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single
power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of
national policy.”50 Here, it seemed that Eden had defined Britain’s policy for the Suez
Crisis, but this was an illusion.
Three days before, on July 27, the matter seemed simple; Nasser had committed
an act of aggression against Britain, and it was up to Britain to show Egypt its place.
Nevertheless, the political atmosphere was changing as Eden learned at the EC meeting
that day. Sir Roger Makins, Britain’s ambassador in Washington, told Eden that the
Americans were reluctant to take action against Nasser.51 Lloyd’s meeting that weekend
with Murphy confirmed this American policy. During the meeting when Lloyd hinted at
the possibility of using force, Murphy cautioned Lloyd that the American people would
not support military action. Instead of the use of force, Murphy discussed the advantages
of calling an international conference.52
When the EC met that Monday morning, Lloyd presented his colleagues with the
American proposal and suggested that it would be wise to hold tripartite talks. Here, the
EC agreed with Lloyd, for the talks would provide the time needed to train and mobilize
the troops. Lloyd advised that Britain should argue that the Suez Canal be placed under
UN jurisdiction. Lord Home then suggested that the matter should be referred to the UN
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at once and a push made to get Egypt charged with aggression. Home’s argument, they
decided, would not work because it would pit Britain against its Arab allies. As the
Chiefs of Staff briefed the EC, they revealed that limited military action could be staged;
nevertheless, since reinforcements would arrive too late, the small force in the area would
fail to hold the canal. It was at this meeting when the committee decided to take the only
option available to them—hold the conference of maritime powers.53 The Chiefs asked
the EC to state the goals of the operation. At this juncture, all unanimously agreed that,
“While our ultimate purpose was to place the Canal under international control, our
immediate objective was to bring about the down fall of the present Egyptian
Government.”54 Conversely, it was argued that this could be achieved by “less elaborate”
means such as a covert operation or a military coup and would be less costly then
physical control of the Canal. In the meantime, they authorized Macmillan to seize
Egypt’s assets in Britain and open negotiation with France about a joint military
operation.55
The EC decided, since the military option was not available, to bide their time and
go along with a conference to internationalize the canal. If Nasser rejected this, they
expected, the international community to support the use of force. In the meantime,
covert operations against Nasser would begin. Consequently, the EC members all
believed that American support for military action would come soon. If the British played
along, they believed, and diplomacy failed, then the Americans would come around to
Britain’s line of thought. Macmillan, the most belligerent member of the EC, remarked
that, “Our general conclusion was that if action had to be taken it must be short and
successful. For immediate needs we could no doubt expect American aid.” 56 In addition,
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a conference, they agreed, would buy the British time to call up their reservists and
prepare the proper equipment.
In addition to misinterpreting American signals for support, Eisenhower and
Dulles made ambiguous statements that Eden and his collogues interpreted to mean that
the U.S. would support some form of military action; for example, Eden stated that
Dulles guaranteed him that, if Britain had to resort to military action, Britain could rely
on the U.S. moral encouragement.57 However, the U.S. wanted a diplomatic solution to
the crisis; Eisenhower knew that a military occupation of Egypt would do nothing in the
end to reconcile the differences between the Britain and Egypt. “Unless the occupying
power was ready to employ the brutalities of dictatorship,” Eisenhower believed, “local
unrest would soon grow into guerilla resistance, then open revolt, and possibly wide scale
conflict.”58 Neither Eden nor the EC mentioned the difficulties and energy it would take
to occupying Egypt. They were focused on one goal; the removal of Nasser from power
and did not weigh the consequences of a long or even short, term occupation of Egypt.
While to the EC the crisis represented a serious challenge to Britain’s position in
the Near East, Eisenhower later stated that he did not view the crisis, “as seriously as did
the Prime Minster.”59 The U.S. followed a policy of protracted diplomacy and hoped this
would mollify Britain’s position. The London Conference epitomized this prolonged
strategy. The Suez Group had always suspected this and accused the U.S. of following a
systematic policy to destroy Britain’s position in the region. In fact, it was the U.S. that
pressured Britain to evacuate the Suez Base back in 1954 and now they saw the U.S.
opposing Britain in its most desperate hour at Suez.60
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Eden and Lloyd told the EC at the second meeting on July 30, that the Americans
and French were anxious to have a maritime conference. They all agreed at this time it
would be wise to follow the American line. Lloyd suggested the conference’s focus
should be to internationalize the Canal along the lines of the Constantinople Convention;
a letter to Nasser would follow stating the outcome of the conference and then “wait for
her [Egypt’s] reaction.” Once Egypt refused to comply with the convention’s demands,
action would follow.61 In the mean time, the Chiefs of Staff were given the authorization
to recall reservist. Immediate concern now revolved around the transportation of troops to
the theater of war. Eden asked Harold Watkinson, the Minster of Transportation, to join
the EC to discuss the issue. Watkinson suggested that since there was a dearth of troop
transports, the only option was to use commercial liners. On the other hand, Watkinson
added, this would lead to a loss in revenue for those sectors.62 Weighing the
consequences of this action, the EC decided to limit transport for the initial phase of the
operation. Eden then revealed to the EC that the French were anxious to participate and
wanted to provide support and troops for the operation. The second meeting ended with
Salisbury advocating cutting of the oil pipelines in Egypt and the War Minster Antony
Head calling for quick action to “overthrow the present regime.”63
At this point, the focus of the two meetings on July 30 revealed that the EC
assessment was that force would be used after Nasser refused the ultimatum of the
upcoming maritime conference. Consequently, the war cabinet decided that the policy
was first to harass Nasser until he discredited himself before the world community and
then attack him until he was removed from power. Publicly, the British would appear to
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promote a peaceful path, while privately they were determined to embark on a path to
overthrow Nasser.
In his memoirs, Eden does not mention the decision made on July 30, nor does he
mention the Egypt Committee’s decision on July 30-31; he begins recollections again on
August 1.64 The other members of the Egypt Committee all seemed to have been struck
by similar amnesia. For example, although he described the Cabinet and Committee
meetings with clarity on July 27, Macmillan’s memoirs do not mention a word of July 30.
He described a meeting that took place at his residency with Murphy and Andrew Foster,
but does not explain any decisions made that day. His tone on that night did surprise
Murphy:
Our conversation that night was easy and relaxed but it was not reminiscent of
past association. Our thoughts were on Suez...I was left with no doubt that the
British Government believed that Suez was a test which could be met only by the
use of force…I was told the French saw eye to eye with the British on the
necessity of making a stand, and that they were prepared to participate in a
military operation.65
Macmillan described that it was his intention to “frighten” the Americans to think that
military action was being considered, “We certainly did our best to frighten him
[Murphy], or at least to leave him in no doubt of [our] determination.”66 Therefore,
Macmillan later claimed in his memoirs that by using belligerent language he tried to
frighten Murphy into believing that Britain was prepared for action and this would push
the U.S. to treat the crisis more seriously. Perhaps that explains Macmillan’s belligerent
language to Murphy, but the fact remains that on July 30 the EC decided to remove
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Nasser. Lloyd does refer to the July 30 meeting in his memoirs, but fails to mention the
EC decision reached that day. Lord Butler, who was ill until July 30, claimed in his
memoirs that he returned to his duties on August 2, but attendance records for the EC that
day reveal that he actually attended the meeting.67 Butler missed the first two meetings of
the EC, but on July 30, he was back. By claiming he was still sick, it would seem that
Butler did not want to be affiliated with the decisions of July 30.
The flaw in the EC’s argument rested in a new approach to the crisis. Since they
saw that Britain was limited in its military response to Nasser, they sought the ad hoc
policy to internationalize Britain’s predicament and hoped that maritime powers with
similar grievance would come to Britain’s aid. To give the British credit for the policy of
seeking an international arrangement to the conflict would be flawed. As Lloyd indicated,
the Americans proposed an international conference, but the British did not read
Eisenhower and Dulles’s intentions. The U.S. wanted to prolong the crisis in order to let
tempers cool and avoid a military conflict. On the other hand, the British thought that a
conference would legitimize the military option they were preparing; the end result would
be U.S. aid and military support and, if not military support, at least moral support.
Macmillan summed up the British point of view:
At this time, we could not believe that the American Administration especially
under the President, who was so friendly, who had commanded our great armies
and had shown such generous appreciation of British qualities of tenacity and
courage would allow our rights and our interests to disappear in a fog of argument
or sentiment or misunderstand our fixity of purpose.68
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To the members of the EC, recent history had shown the U.S. had always had the
transient position of noninvolvement in international conflicts, but would always come to
Britain’s defense when the United Kingdom needed assistance. However, Eden and his
colleagues failed to realize that this was neither the era of the First World War nor the
Second World War. The age of balance of power politics was over and the new period of
ideological warfare was in full swing.69 The U.S. was now more concerned with
containing Communism than helping Great Britain maintain its imperial ambitions. The
EC members did not recognize or want to recognize Britain’s subordinate role in
international politics.
A second flaw in the decision made on July 30 was that the EC did not anticipate
the possibility that the conference might conclude that Britain had no legitimate right to
the canal—the body of maritime powers might also reject Britain’s position. In other
words, the committee members did not consider probable alternative options; they only
considered the outcome that they wanted. The EC focused on Nasser’s rejection to the
terms that would be presented to him and the military response or, even better, the
international military response of maritime powers. The ramifications of this decision
would not be seen until late October and early November when Britain found herself in a
more complex situation.
On the afternoon of July 30, after the EC meeting, Eden, Salisbury, Lloyd and
Macmillan met Murphy for lunch at Number 10 Downing Street. The British hoped to
learn about the American stance to the crisis. To Murphy, the British appeared nostalgic,
for they did not recognize their new position in the Cold War arena.70 They seemed to
prefer the nineteenth century policy of “gunboat diplomacy.”71
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Later that night, Macmillan dined alone with Murphy at Number 11 Downing
Street to discuss the crisis in its full details. 72 It was at this meeting that Macmillan
hinted to Murphy what Britain’s intentions were. Murphy then informed Eisenhower that
the British saw Nasser’s action as a challenge to their authority in the region and the only
answer to this challenge would be the use of force. “I was left with no doubt,” Murphy
explained, “that the British Government believed that Suez was a test which could be met
only by the use of force.”73 Nevertheless, Macmillan did not find the alacrity for military
action from the Americans that the British were displaying.
The EC met three times the next day, July 31,—once in the morning, then in the
afternoon and again in the evening. The number of meetings that day demonstrated the
urgency within Eden’s government to find a quick response to Nasser’s action. At the
moment, Eden decided that it would be circumspect not to inform Parliament of every
move the EC made. He told his colleagues that the intension was to restrict Parliament
and the public as much as possible about the movement of troops. Head stressed that if
troops had to be recalled, Parliament had to authorize it. The EC decided to tell the House
of Commons that the deployment was only a “precautionary movement” and was
intended as a deterrent and not a preparation for war. Furthermore, the Chiefs of Staff
informed the EC that the French would accept a British allied commander; they
recommended General Sir Hugh Stockwell.74 The Chiefs also presented the EC with the
invasion plan. With the exception of nuclear weapons, they advised that HMG use all
means available to her on military targets. This meant that military installations were
legitimate targets for conventional, chemical, and biological weapons.

21

In addition to the decisions made that day, the EC elected to reject the American
proposal to invite the members of the Convention of 1888 to the upcoming conference
because this would include Russia and Egypt. According to Lloyd, by giving the Soviet
Union a role to play in the conference, the EC construed that the USSR would be given a
role in the outcome of the Canal’s final status; moreover, since the EC members wanted
to exclude Egypt, including Russia would give the Egyptians an indirect role. 75
When Harold Macmillan met with his personal staff on August 1, he informed
them the stated goal of the government was, “to produce another Egyptian government,”
that would conform to Britain’s demands.76 At that meeting, Macmillan revealed all the
Egypt Committee decisions and minutes that were made up to that day. This confirmed
that the EC decisions were not confined to the senior ministers in Eden’s Egypt
Committee. As Macmillan’s staff meetings demonstrated, most junior ministers knew
something about the courses the Eden’s government intended to take. This is an
important point, for after the crisis was over many within the Prime Minster’s
government would behave as if they knew nothing about the stated goals of the EC.
The EC assembled on the afternoon of August 1 before Eden and Lloyd were to
meet Dulles. They discussed the upcoming maritime talks and the issues that would be
brought to Dulles’s attention; in spite of this, they kept in mind that no matter what
happened during the discussions that the stated goal was the internationalization of the
Suez Canal and bring about “down fall of the present Egyptian Government.” Eden
stressed the merits of the maritime conference. By going along with the talks, he thought,
it would insure American participation or at least approval of a military response. The
Committee’s objective in attending the talks were:

22

1.) To give the military the time it needed to prepare for combat;
2.) To secure international control of the Suez Canal; if Nasser refused
international control of the Canal, this would justify military action to the
international community and not stain Britain’s image when action was taken;
3.) To secure U.S. military, economic, and moral support.
The conference, the EC agreed, should not be allowed to get out of hand. Again, they
stressed its purpose should be to give the Egyptian government an ultimatum followed by
a military response once Nasser refused to comply.77
Again, the flaw in this rigid course of action was it did not consider alternatives.
The EC’s obstinate attitude to remove Nasser made Macmillan, Eden, Lloyd and
Salisbury choose a course that would ultimately lead to disaster; for example, the
insistence by the EC to secure international support and keep Britain’s image untarnished
would force Eden to choose between this and a successful outcome to the current crisis.
Furthermore, the momentum of the conflict would now slip from Britain’s intended goal
of finding a pretext for war to the U.S.’s delaying tactic until war was no longer an
alternative.
Another problem raised in the EC by Brook was the issue of two Egyptian
Destroyers that had been purchased before the crisis. How could Britain release the
destroyers and guarantee that they would not be used against the invasion force? Three
choices were presented to the EC: one, they could allow the ships to set sail for Egypt;
two, hold the ships indefinitely; or three, delay the departure until the crisis was resolved.
The EC weighed the options and decided that the first would give Egypt two modern
destroyers that could be used against the British forces. The second choice would
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antagonize Egypt and this would have caused them to act against British ships going
through the Canal. In the eyes of world opinion Britain would appear antagonistic, and
this would go against EC policy. The third choice was the best course of the three, but
this too presented a predicament. The problem the EC faced was how long could Britain
hold the ships? At this point, after long deliberation, the EC decided that a fourth option
would be possible. Since the ships were built in Britain, they needed British parts and
weapons. The torpedoes and armaments on the destroyers were not interchangeable.
Therefore, the EC decided to deny these armaments and parts to the Egyptians and this in
turn would make them ineffective. All agreed that this would be the best option and Peter
Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade, was given permission to carry out the
task.
At this stage, both the U.S. and GB did not want to refer the matter to the UN.
The British thought that UN action would be futile, for the Soviets could veto any
resolution that was presented to the Security Council. On the other hand, the U.S. was
opposed to UN action because it raised the issue of the Panama Canal, as Eisenhower and
Dulles feared. The U.S. stressed that Suez was an international matter where Panama was
an American one. Since the Constantinople Convention of 1888 proved that Suez was an
international issue, a conference on that basis would be the best avenue to avoid reference
to Panama, Eisenhower and Dulles thought.
The Commonwealth was informed of Britain’s current position, and the EC
wanted to know what these nations thought of the current crisis. Eden thought that the
Commonwealth could help Britain at the upcoming conference and once the negotiations
failed (as the EC hoped), the Commonwealth could provide Britain with some sort of

24

military support against Egypt. The anticipated tone was not what the EC wanted to hear.
Instead, those nations within the Commonwealth that were not directly affected by the
seizure of the Canal—Canada, in particular—did not want any entanglements in the
crisis; those that were affected like New Zealand and Australia wanted to help resolve the
matter peacefully.78
Also at the meeting of August 1, the EC received the Chiefs of Staffs analysis in a
report entitled Action Against Egypt.79 The EC received a lugubrious response from the
Chiefs, who reported that this was a new type of war unlike anything seen before. After
WWII, the British had 750,000 men under arms, but they were structured along NATO
lines to deal with a large-scale war in Europe or insurgencies in the colonies.80
Consequently, British troops were insufficiently trained and equipped to deal with an
overseas mission. This explained the reason HMG could not stage a show of force on
July 27. That day, too, the Chiefs overestimated the worth of the Czech arms that Nasser
received in September of 1955. Their planning for an initial response was based on the
assumption that the Egyptians had trained with the new equipment and that some of the
weapons they had were more advanced than British weapons; for example, the Egyptians
had 45 new Mig 15s, 24 Il 28s and 300 new Soviet tanks delivered to them under the
arms deal.81 This caused the Chiefs to report to the EC that an invasion force could not be
made ready for another five to six weeks.82 First, the Chiefs told the EC that the forces in
Libya could not be used due to the agreement with that country which stated that their use
could not be directed against another Arab country. Second, the Chiefs assessed that
Cyprus did not have a deep port to load and unload equipment; the nearest port was a
thousand miles away in Malta. Finally, the airbases on the two Mediterranean Islands
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needed repairs and maintenance. The Chiefs recommended the tactics of using shock
troops to parachute behind enemy lines, followed by an invasion force of three divisions
to hold the Canal Zone.83 To add to their troubles the paratroopers required for the
operation were engaged in an insurgency in Cyprus and needed to be brought back to
Britain for training.
The EC now faced a predicament that seemed as complex as Nasser’s initial
action. They now knew that five to six weeks were needed to prepare the troops and
equipment. If an invasion took place, the Arab World’s opinion of Britain would turn
hostile and was likely to lead to further losses of territory and influence. In addition, once
in the Canal Zone, how would Britain keep it safely secure against Egyptian guerilla
raids? With fait accompli, the EC chose to overlook these problems and focus on Nasser
removal. They were overoptimistic, whatever the means, the removal of Nasser was
morally correct. This tenaciousness was probably because Eden and his colleagues
thought that Nasser’s removal would solve Britain’s entire host of troubles in the Middle
East—like it did with its intervention in Egypt in 1882. The legacy of Britain’s imperial
past comes into play here on August 1, 1956. With all the facts laid down before them,
the EC still espoused the pugnacious stand of Nasser’s overthrow. Moreover, they were
blind to reality, for Britain was not the power it was in 1882; they wanted to maintain
Britain’s prestige at all cost and believe the illusion of Britain great power status—that
illusion would end with the crumbling of Britain’s influence throughout the region.
If some of the EC members vacillated that day in going ahead with military
action, the meeting with John Dulles, the American Secretary of State, would convince
them to go along. He met Lloyd at the Foreign Office and began the discussion stating
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that Nasser’s control of an international waterway was intolerable. He went on to say that
Nasser had to give up the Canal.84 Dulles argued that first international opinion must be
mobilized against Nasser and that force would be used as last resort. Lloyd found that the
U.S. adamantly intended to follow an argument along the lines of the 1888 Convention.
This would settle the issue of Panama, which the U.S. was so concerned about, yet the
Secretary of State heartened Lloyd by stating:
A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to
swallow…We must make a genuine effort to bring world opinion to favor the
international operation of the canal…it should be possible to create a world
opinion so adverse to Nasser that he would be isolated. Then if a military
operation had to be undertaken, it would be more apt to succeed and have less
grave repercussions than if it had been undertaken precipitately.85
As Dulles and Lloyd then walked over from the Foreign Office to Number 10, they
noticed a crowd gathered cheering Dulles and the Americans. Like a thick intoxicating
smog, anxiety filled the air over London. The people, prodded by media reports, saw
Dulles as a savior who had come to redeem them from the insatiable “Egyptian Hitler.” It
comforted the public to know that the old wartime allies were working together again, or
so it seemed.86
When they arrived at the Prime Minster’s residency, Dulles handed Eden a
message from Eisenhower stating that he felt Eden’s pain during the crisis. The President
went on to tell Eden that he was glad to see the allies agreed on the matter, but was
concerned about Britain’s belligerence:
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But early this morning I received the messages, communicated to me through
Murphy from you and Harold Macmillan, telling me on a most secret basis of
your decision to employ force without delay or attempting any intermediate less
drastic steps. We recognize the transcendent worth of the Canal to the free world
and the possibility that eventually the use of force might become necessary in
order to protect international rights.87
Eisenhower stressed to Eden that at this point in the crisis diplomacy was the most
prudent and judicious course. In addition, the President stressed that public opinion in
the U.S. and the world would not acquiesce to the use of force this early in the conflict.88
Moved by the crowd outside, Dulles presented Eden with encouraging words that
resonated in Eden’s ears for months.89 Dulles repeated to Eden what he told Lloyd and
stressed the internationality of the waterway. Eden mentioned that military plans were
available if the U.S. wanted to see them, but Dulles responded that disclosure was not
necessary at this time. Like the feeling of distress a few nights before, relief overwhelmed
Eden that evening as he hurried to meet with his full Cabinet.90
Eden and Lloyd misconstrued Eisenhower and Dulles’s words to mean that the
U.S. would go along with the use of force as long as a genuine effort was made to
negotiate. They cheerfully told the full Cabinet that the U.S. did not oppose the use of
force. Repeating Dulles’s words that Nasser must “disgorge” the Canal, he told them that
a genuine effort had to be made to find a peaceful settlement in order to keep the U.S. on
their side. When all efforts have failed, then the U.K. could go in with U.S. support.
Dulles’s words to “disgorge” and the “use of force” burned in their hearts and minds.91
Dulles also agreed, Lloyd told the Cabinet, to send a communiqué to Egypt that strongly
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condemned their action. When the Foreign Minster mentioned that it was arranged that
the conferences composition was along the lines of the 1888 Convention and would
include the Soviet Union, the Cabinet erupted in an uproar. Lloyd assuaged their fears
stating that this list was not final and that Britain would insist that the U.S. have a
timetable for the conference.92 The timetable, they thought, would pressure the
Americans not to drag on the negotiate process indefinitely. In addition to the 1888
Convention signatories, the conference included those nations that used the canal most
according to tonnage and trade—this indirectly would include the United States. In all,
twenty-four nations that were directly dependant on the Canal were invited to attend.
As of August 2, 1956, the nation was still behind Eden and his colleagues as the
unity in the House of Commons clearly showed. For almost five hours that day, a debate
ensued in the House of Commons over the conference. It seemed the British were now
willing to compromise, for the tone in the Commons called for the internationalization of
the Canal and not a reversal of Nasser’s action. Eden began with a review of the terms of
the tripartite meeting and the upcoming conference and he ecstatically added American
support was forthcoming. He then went into the history of the Constantinople
Convention of 1888 and the agreement that Nasser had endorsed six weeks ago.93 After
Eden spoke, Gaitskell issued a condemnation of Nasser and approval of the
internationalization issue. Passionately comparing Nasser to Hitler, Gaitskell recalled
that, “It was all terribly familiar…it is exactly what we had encountered from Mussolini
and Hitler.”94 As other liberals approved of the conference, Walter Elliot, one of the
Liberal leaders in the Commons, warned that if negotiations were allowed to drag on
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until December, Nasser’s victory would be complete, “Let us not find that we have lost
the peace by talking too much about it.”95
The issue of canal dues came up again in early August. Financial confusion was
sparked when a group of perplexed bankers asked Macmillan whether shipowners should
pay their dues to the old Suez Canal Company. Macmillan inquired why they were asking
such an absurd question. They told him that they were worried that if an international
court found Nasser justified in his action, they would then owe dues to the new
nationalized company. At that moment, Macmillan erupted into a tirade, pointing out
their argument was flawed and sided with Nasser. Disheartened, the bankers left
Macmillan promising to do the right thing.96 The British wanted shipowners to continue
to pay their dues in London, where 55% of the dues were collected. Eden tried to solicit
Dulles to support Britain in its pursuit to allow as little money as possible to pass into
Nasser’s hand; however, Dulles told Eden that the U.S. government was powerless when
it came to American ships registered in other countries. As for domestic shipowners,
Dulles replied that the U.S. could advise them, but if they refused to obey, the
government could not force them to comply. As traffic flowed through the Canal, the
EC’s fear that a sense of normality would return to the Suez Canal was now realized.
At the EC meeting on August 2, Macmillan mentioned the idea of a military
operation with Israeli support. Eden shrugged off this proposal as unrealistic. 97 Eden
knew that Britain’s allies in the Arab World would be forced to side with Egypt. Then not
only would the Canal be lost, but all influence in the Middle East would be lost too;
furthermore, there was the issue of the new Egyptian government that was to replace
Nasser. How long would it last if Britain accepted Israel as a partner in a collision against
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Egypt? Eden raised these questions in early August, but it would seem theses thoughts
did not cross his mind on October 22—the day he sent Lloyd to meet with the Israelis in
Sèvres, France to the plan the invasion of Egypt.
On August 3, Macmillan brought up the subject of Israel again. This time Eden
did not calmly explain his point. Macmillan knew that the Arab World would not stand
with Britain if Israel were to get involved, but he was also aware that time was not on
Britain’s side. The longer the crisis was allowed to drag on, the harder it became to
reverse Nasser’s actions. Before the EC meeting and without its approval, Macmillan
held a conference with Winston Churchill and army officers who supported his
position.98 They decided that an Israeli attack on Egypt would be Britain’s casus belli.
Macmillan and Churchill’s intentions were to reverse Nasser’s action before the whole
Middle East was under his control. Moreover, once British influence in the region
evaporated the loss of Britain’s strength and honor, they feared, would follow.99
Therefore, Macmillan feared that Britain as he knew it, would no longer exist. His sense
of urgency to attack Egypt was prodded by the fear of losing Britain’s world power
status—in other words, Britain’s prestige. In his incessant attempts to goad his
colleagues, Macmillan would split the Cabinet and the Egypt Committee into two
groups—those who wanted to act and those who wanted to wait.
Eden and Lloyd were not opposed to the use of force, but were opposed to the use
of Israel in an operation against Egypt. When the two mentioned it to Nuri, the Iraqi
prime minister warned them that Nasser’s victory would be complete if such a thing
happened. When Eden spoke to Churchill on the subject, he surprisingly learned that his
tone was similar to Macmillan’s. As thoughts of conspiracy inundated Eden’s mind, he
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became paranoid to the point that he even took control—or at least tried—of all
transactions within his government.100
With pressure now coming from within his own party, Eden’s obsession with
Nasser increased. His message to Eisenhower on August 5 revealed his belief that Nasser
was omnipresent in all the troubles Britain faced. He told Eisenhower that:
Nasser has embarked on a course which is unpleasantly familiar…he seeks to
further his ambition from Morocco to the Persian Gulf…I know that Nasser is
active wherever Muslims can be found, even as far as Nigeria…I have never
thought Nasser a Hitler; he has no warlike people behind him. But the parallel
with Mussolini is close. Neither of us can forget the lives and treasures he cost us
before he was finally dealt with. The removal of Nasser, and the installation in
Egypt of a regime less hostile to the West, must therefore also rank high among
our objective.101
Eden knew that Britain could not stage an operation alone, and Israel, as an ally was out
of the question. But if he could persuade Eisenhower to join the crusade, then it was
possible that Britain could remove Nasser and avoid collusion with Israel. This obsession
would come to destroy Eden, for by alienating Nasser he would set the course of events
that would lead to the invasion of November 4.
When EC met on August 7, Macmillan asked what the objective of an invasion
was. He answered his own question by stating that the removal of Nasser from power was
the main objective. Macmillan went on to warn his colleagues that unless Nasser was
removed from power, the Canal and other British interests in the region would be
threatened. His plan called for an invasion to be launched from Libya, ignoring the treaty
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that Britain had with that country. Once this was achieved, he informed his colleagues,
Alexandria would be taken and after that, a march on Cairo would remove Nasser from
his seat of power.102
The EC would meet on August 8, 9, and 10, but would not meet again until
August 14. Why did Eden decide not to hold any meetings until August 14? The
conference was still a few days away, August 16. Days before the conference was to be
held, Eden’s colleagues noticed that the Prime Minster was jumpy and emotionally
drained. The Permanent Under-Secretary Richard Powell described Eden as, “very
jumpy, very nervous, very wrought…”103 Eden’s illness was beginning to take its toll and
the ubiquitous medicine bag he carried around increased in size. At a certain point in the
conflict, Horace Evans, Eden’s Doctor, told Lord Butler that he could not live on
stimulants anymore.104 Evans recommended that Eden needed to rest and as a result, Lord
Butler took over in Eden’s absence.105 Eden later admitted that he had to increase the
dosage of drugs and stimulants since Nasser’s seizure of the Canal because his pain from
his illness was unbearable.106
It was a critical moment and Eden noticed that the unity of the country was
fading. He addressed the nation on August 8. In the broadcast, Eden juxtaposed Nasser
with plunder and proposed an end to the threat of the waterway. He stated:
The alternatives are now clear to see. If we all join together to create an
international system for the canal…There will be wealth for all to share, including
Egypt…But if anyone is going to snatch and grab and try to pocket what really
belongs to the world, the result would be impoverishment for all…We cannot
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agree that an act of plunder which threatens the livelihood of many nations shall
be allowed to succeed.107
Eden next repeated a familiar tone used throughout the crisis comparing Nasser to the
fascist regimes of Mussolini and Hitler. “The pattern is familiar to many of us, my
friends: we all know this is how fascist governments behave and we all remember, only
too well, what the cost can be in giving in to fascism…Our quarrel is not with Egypt, still
less with the Arab World; it is with Nasser.”108 It seemed that Eden was trying to send a
message to Nasser not to attend the upcoming conference—now officially called the
London Conference. Lord Butler later stated that, “The attempt to negotiate a settlement
was not helped by Eden’s broadcast. This made it virtually impossible for Nasser to
attend…”109 By stating that “our quarrel is…with Nasser” was Eden trying to send a
signal to Nasser not to attend the conference? Indeed, by stating that his “quarrel” was
with the Egyptian leader, Eden personified the crisis and made it virtually impossible for
Nasser to attend. If Nasser did not attend the conference and then refused its outcome,
this would give Britain the pretext to go in and remove the threat. Eden was a seasoned
diplomat and he knew that in diplomacy one does not antagonize the participants of a
dispute days before they are to convene.
At the August 10, meeting of the EC the Chiefs of Staff rejected Macmillan’s
Libya plan and presented “Operation Musketeer”, which called for a direct attack on
Alexandria by an amphibious force combined with airdrops on Egyptian Army positions.
This full-scale invasion called on the Anglo-French forces to neutralize Egypt’s
resistance. General Stockwell stated that because Port Said was similar to a “cork in a
bottle” and a concentration of forces into a small area like Port Said would be dangerous,
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Alexandria, he argued, would offer the best field of battle.110 The Chiefs told the EC the
main objectives: First, destroy the Egyptian Air Force; second, civilian causalities and
collateral damage were inevitable, but the port invasion could not be avoided; third, the
nearby airfield should be taken swiftly, for it would provide for the airlift of troops and
equipment; fourth, air and sea forces must combine firepower and destroy the Egyptian
army as quickly as possible; and fifth, all this must be ready by September 15. The Chiefs
recommended that the objective should be to take the Canal and not march on Cairo, for
this would need more troops and equipment to occupy the capital city. They then gave the
EC a list of the amount of troops that were needed.111
Anthony Eden opened the London Conference on August 16 at eleven in the
morning with a brief statement on the common interest of the attendees. Lloyd then
proceeded and Dulles followed.112 Two proposals were presented; the first was made by
India and called for the 1888 Agreement to be renewed and the Americans made the
second calling for a new organization to run the Canal. Unlike the Convention of 1888,
this would allow future members the right to join according to usage and trade.
Furthermore, Dulles added that the Canal should be insulated from politics — it was to
become neutral ground.
As emotions ran high, the debate continued until on August 22 a compromise was
finally reached. The agreement, known as the Eighteen Power Plan, was confirmed and
stated that the Canal was an international organ and will be maintained as such.113 Prime
Minster Robert Menzies of Australia was to lead a five-member team to Cairo and
present Nasser with the results. The moment that Eden and his colleagues longed for had
finally arrived. The Egypt Committee knew that only two outcomes were possible. Either
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Nasser could accept the conditions of the London Conference or he would reject them.
All depend now on the success or failure of the Menzies Mission.
The EC’s assessment of the Menzies Mission was based on facts that were no
longer fluid. Domestic polls showed that the public was beginning to recognize that
nothing could be done about the current situation and it was better to follow the
American line of negotiating a solution. Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman Brook pointed out
as early as August 9 that public opinion was starting to vacillate over the Suez Crisis.114
A Gallup Poll revealed that only 33 percent of those polled supported military action if
Nasser refused to obey the Eighteen Power Proposal and the Labour Opposition too was
growing doubtful.115 As popular opinion grew haggard over the episode and the Menzies
Mission left, the EC eagerly awaited news from Cairo.
Doubt and pessimism began to overwhelm the EC and the Chiefs of Staff. The
resolve over a military operation was now broken. It began in early August when Cabinet
and EC members gave tacit disapproval for military action. By August 22, Lord Butler
began to show signs of anxiety over the current policies and began to voice his
disapproval to his colleagues. Butler mentioned his apprehension to Salisbury who in turn
sent Eden an alarming letter that Cabinet members were concerned over the legality of
Britain’s case.116 However, Butler did not directly speak to Eden about his uneasiness
until August 28. Perhaps he was afraid to face Eden alone, but the outburst in the Egypt
Committee meeting of August 24 would give him the courage to talk four days later.
It was Walter Monckton, the Minister of Defense, who first blatantly expressed
his distress over the military option at the committee meeting of August 24. When
Macmillan and Eden monotonously began to repeat their belligerent language, Monckton,
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worried that Britain’s image would suffer by attacking Egypt, fervently responded that an
invasion was not a foregone conclusion. The First Sea Lord Mountbatten too voiced his
doubts about a successful campaign. 117
The debate that day began when Eden proposed that once Nasser rejected the
Eighteen Power Plan, the strategy was to go to the Security Council next, but a resolution
would probably not be approved because the Soviets would veto it. Therefore, the EC
decided not to seek a resolution and get caught up in a debate at the U.N. Formal U.N.
support would be enough to begin military action. Eden wanted the Ministers to endorse
the plan, but when Macmillan proposed that military operations could begin before going
to the U.N., Monckton accused Eden and Macmillan of trying to “rush things through”
and he could not “push the button” that made war a foregone conclusion. He asked them
if they would have the support of the public and the international community if they went
in.118 At this point, Monckton was alone, for Eden and Macmillan had the approval of the
other ministers. They rejected Monckton’s logic and fired back that Britain’s future gave
them legitimacy.119 William Clark, Eden’s Press Secretary, noticed that EC members
were all searching frantically for a “moral basis” to prove their case to Monkton.120
When Monckton was coldshouldered, Butler remained wary and did not speak out
that day. Butler, Monckton, and Mountbatten were not as organized as Eden and
Macmillan were, for if they were and voiced their discontent earlier they could have
organized serious opposition to the plan. Nevertheless, Butler afraid of a backlash only,
confided his opposition to a closed circle, Monckton would lose his job as Defense
Minster for his opposition to Eden.121
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It seemed that the very foundation of the Eden’s government was shaken by the
schisms of the EC. Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, said he was “horrified” by the
incident of August 24.122 He told Eden that if division existed in the inner circle, then
expectation of unanimous public support was probably nil.123 He emphatically warned
Eden if they did not show resolve in the EC, then Nasser’s victory would be complete
and Britain, “might as well as government (and indeed as a country) go out of
business.”124 Butler thought that Eden alienated Nasser with his rhetoric. By comparing
the Egyptian leader to Hitler and affiliating him with fascism, Butler felt that Eden was
not making a sincere effort to resolve the conflict diplomatically.125
Eden was shaken by Monckton’s outburst. He knew there was opposition to an
invasion, but he never suspected his own defense minister had such strong feelings.
Those who saw Eden having second thoughts wrote him letters to encourage him.
Salisbury wrote Eden that it was well known that Monckton had doubt about an invasion,
but the problem was, Salisbury revealed, Lord Butler was dissatisfied with the current
situation and that there were a number of other younger members of the Cabinet who had
not made up their minds.126 Salisbury went on to tell Eden that unless he presented a
resolute opinion these younger Cabinet members would oppose the current plan and the
government would fall. Norman Brook gave Eden a blacklist of those ministers who
could not be counted on. On the top of the list were the names of Lord Butler and Lord
Monckton.127
With his inner circle split and the cabinet wavering, the burden was on Eden to
find the strength to continue. He decided to try one more effort to nudge the Americans
into action. The tactic, he decided, was to play the Communist card.128 If successful, it
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might be enough to push the U.S. to help Britain either militarily or morally. The problem
with this course was that the British tried it before during the months prior to the crisis
and it was unsuccessful then. Why did Eden think the Americans would go along this
time? Furthermore, Eden ignored the Communist threat up until now. His ambassador in
Moscow, Sir William Hayter, accused Eden of a lack of concern for the Soviets during
the crisis.129
As the London Conference closed on August 24 and the attendees waited for
word from the Menzies Mission, Eden ruminated on the crisis and the outburst at the EC
meeting. His private secretary described him in a terrible state and his temper at an alltime high.130 That weekend between serious contemplation and temper tantrums, Eden
found the time to write Eisenhower. Hoping that the U.S. would go along with his tactic
and not allow the Soviets into the Middle East, Eden’s message emphasized the Soviet
menace to Western oil supplies and the posed threat the region faced from the Kremlin:
I have no doubt the bear is using Nasser, with or without his knowledge, to further
his immediate aims. These are, I think, first to dislodge the West from the Middle
East, and second to get a foothold in Africa so as to dominate that continent in
turn. In this connexion I have seen a reliable report from someone who was
present at the lunch which Shepilov…there the Soviet claim was that they “only
wanted to see Arab unity in Asia and Africa and the abolition of all foreign bases
and exploitation. An agreed unified Arab nation must take its place in the world.
The policy is clearly aimed at…our Middle East oil supplies. All this makes me
more than ever sure that Nasser must not be allowed to get away with it this
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time…It looks as though we shall have a few days until Nasser gives Menzies his
final reply. After that we should be in a position to act swiftly.131
By using the “bear” analogy Eden hoped to convince Eisenhower that the elimination of
Nasser would remove the Russian threat to Western oil interests.
Monday morning, August 27, the EC once more, reviewed its position. They
could either go to the U.N. and present the charges against Nasser to the Security Council
or ignore the U.N. and risk an international backlash. This all relied on the rejection of
the Eighteen Powers Plan. In the end, the EC decided to go to the U.N. and sent a secret
message to Eisenhower and Dulles stating that American help was needed in the Security
Council.132 Eisenhower was aware that something was brewing among the British and
French, he was getting “bits of information” on British mobilization. Reports, too, were
coming in that the French and British were evacuating their nationals from the Middle
East. 133
Eden convoked a full cabinet meeting to force his government to bring about a
decision on the matter. He told the Cabinet that the goverment agreed that Nasser’s
actions were a threat to Britain’s existence and that this threat has to be dealt with force if
all efforts failed. Eden emphasized that all attempts would be made to find a diplomatic
solution to the crisis. Monckton once more voiced his concern that public opinion at
home and abroad were against any form of a military response.134 Ignoring Monckton’s
remark, Eden reassured those who were undecided that force would be used only as a last
resort. The Cabinet agreed that action in the U.N. Security Council was the wisest
option.135
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The Menzies Mission arrived in Cairo on Sunday, September 2. The following
day the Australian Prime Minster met with Nasser. Before meeting Menzies, Nasser saw
Loy Henderson, the American ambassador in Cairo. He told Henderson that Ali Sabri,
who represented Egypt in the London Conference, told him that Menzies was sent to give
Egypt an ultimatum. “I want to reach an agreement.” Nasser told Henderson, “Instead
you sent this Australian mule to threaten me.”136 Upon meeting with Menzies, Nasser
refused the Eighteen Power Proposal. Menzies in turn presented Nasser with the expected
ultimatum. Seven days late the negotiations were at a stalemate; Nasser would not budge
and Menzies left Cairo in failure.
The day Menzies arrived in Cairo, Eisenhower sent Eden a telegram stating that
time should be given for the Menzies Mission to work and if that did not accomplish
anything, U.N. action could result. Eisenhower was referring to the message that the EC
sent on August 27, asking the U.S. for support in the Security Council. The President
spoke frankly, telling Eden that force could not be applied at this time. Referring to the
evacuation reports he received earlier he went on to say: “Even now military preparations
and civilian evacuations exposed to public view seem to be solidifying support for
Nasser…I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of
using force…”137 This worried Eden. He thought that if he could not count on American
military support at least he could count on them to support Britain in the U.N. On
September 6, he wrote back to Eisenhower:
In the 1930s Hitler established his position by a series of carefully planed
movements. These began with the Rhineland and were followed by successive
acts of aggression…His actions were tolerated and excused…Similarly the
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seizure of the Suez Canal is, we are convinced, the opening gambit in a planned
campaign designed by Nasser to expel all Western influence and interests from
Arab countries.138
Eden went on to make the Hitler/Nasser analogy and told Eisenhower that the Egyptian’s
ultimate goal is to control the world’s oil resources. He warned the President to put down
this “Napoleon of the Arabs” before the “ignoble end of our [Britain’s] long history139
On September 8, Eisenhower replied to Eden’s telegram stating that Eden was
applying too much worth to Nasser. He told the Prime Minster that Britain’s history was
not going to end because Nasser held a canal. The President wrote:
Whenever, on any international question, I find myself differing even slightly
from you, I feel a deep compulsion to re-examine my position instantly and
carefully. But permit me to suggest that when you use phrases in connection with
the Suez affair, like “ignoble end to our history” in describing the possible future
of your great country, you are making of Nasser a much more important figure
than he is.140
However, Eden and the Egypt Committee did not see it that way. They tried to appease
Nasser in the past, but Nasser would not be appeased. In their eyes, Nasser always
appeared to want more, and he took more. When Eden spoke of “ignoble end,” he meant
the end of Britain’s longstanding position and prestige in both the region and world.
Being that it was not the same empire that it was in the eighteenth century, it was still an
empire and that made Britain a great power with influence in world affairs. Initially, what
Eden and his colleagues feared most was Nasser replacing them in the Middle East.
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The situation was so critical that Eden decided to consult the Cabinet about
calling back Parliament, which was on recess since late August. There he hoped to
present his case and find support. After the Menzies Mission failed, the Egypt Committee
approved the decision to go the Security Council with or without American support. That
day the Chiefs presented the Committee with the new military plan, “Musketeer
Revised,” which called for the capture of Port Said by amphibious assault. Monckton
stressed that civilian casualties would be high and timing was important because the
Mediterranean climate would soon worsen. It seemed that Monckton was trying to add as
much pessimism to the whole venture as he possibly could. Monckton also warned that
an attack after October 6 would be futile because the weather in the area would get
worse.141 Therefore, the decision to march on Cairo was thrown out because of the time
restraint, and “Musketeer Revised” was Britain’s new Holy Grail.
It became apparent to Eden that the U.S. did not favor U.N. action when Dulles
proposed the Users Club Association (later called SCUA or Suez Canal Users
Association), which was yet another delay tactic by the Americans. Dulles was vague in
what the precise use of SCUA was, but he said it would organize navigation, hire pilots,
and supervise the management of the Suez Canal. Dulles assured Lloyd that if Nasser
rejected this plan, future terms might not be so appealing. Yet, Dulles was not willing to
deny the Canal dues paid by American shipowners.142 This concerned the British for they
foresaw another legerdemain attempt by Dulles to forestall the invasion.
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, was furious with
the Users Club proposal. He accused Dulles of leading Britain to its demise.143 The
morning before a full Cabinet meeting was to convene on September 11, Eden telephoned
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Macmillan to convey his fears about SCUA.144 That afternoon, Eden’s Egypt Committee
gathered to discuss the decision to go along with Dulles’s new plan. He told his
colleagues that they had three courses of action available: (1) military action along the
lines recommended by the Joint Chiefs—keeping in mind that the U.S. would oppose the
use of force at this time; (2) refer the matter to the Security Council—the U.S. was not in
agreement here too; (3) go along with Dulles’s SCUA alternative and keep the U.S. on
the British side.145 Eden believed by going along with the Users Club, he would bond the
U.S. to Britain’s strategy to remove Nasser. 146 Macmillan brought up that economic
conditions would worsen if Britain kept delaying. This would “undermine our financial
position” he told the Cabinet. Monckton again communicated his discontent with the use
of force. He warned if the U.S. did not agree to go along, the Near East would erupt and
the Britain would be isolated internationally.147 The Cabinet decided to endorse SCUA.
The minutes of the Committee that day revealed why it endorsed SCUA. They
hoped that by supporting this new initiative they would receive U.S. support in a Security
Council resolution later. Moreover, that day the Committee decided to continue
mobilization and approved “Musketeer Revised.”148 Besides, the new military plan
adjusted well to the delay for the Chiefs needed more time to prepare the armed forces.
As Eden’s problems compounded, yet another one arose. The unity that he found
in Parliament on July 27 was waning quickly among all parties. When the recalled
members of the House of Commons arrived from their summer recess, Eden told them on
September 12, that Egypt was in breach of the 1888 Convention and that Great Britain
was coordinating with the French and Americans to resolve this breach. He went on to
state that the canal should be placed under international control, but if Egypt refuses to
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comply HMG would have no take whatever action it deemed fit “either through the
United Nations, or by other means…”149
During the debate in Parliament, Eden even failed to unite his own party. The
Conservatives raised concerns over the crisis and were split between the doves and
hawks.150 The Liberals and Labour united and wanted Eden to go to the U.N before any
sort of military response; the Suez Group wanted military action to begin as soon as
possible.151 Lord Hinchingbrooke, an MP and member of the Suez Group, wanted
immediate action and commented that Britain should not be afraid of using “a little
gunboat diplomacy.”152 Julian Amery pressured Eden to act now or all would be lost.
Then, the Labor opposition voiced their concern. Gaitskell and his party refused to
entertain the thought of action without U.N. approval.153 Eden addressed Parliament and
stressed that should Nasser refuse SCUA, Britain would be justified to use whatever
method it deemed fit. At that moment, the Labor benches exploded with chants of
“Resign! Resign!”154
Trapped between opposition in Parliament and in the EC, on September 14 Eden
appeared to lose his nerve.155 He met with the Suez Group leaders that day and tried to
explain the government’s current policy; they were not convinced. A paradox in Eden’s
decision-making occurred that day. Perhaps he was feeling the burden of trying to
appease the Suez Group. He irrationally decided to antagonize Egypt and turn world
opinion against Britain.
Going back to the debate in the Cabinet on September 11, which settled on going
along with SCUA, Eden made a volte-face and decided to call-up the EC on September
14, to work on a new plan, named “Operation Pileup.” Up to this point in the conflict, the
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EC focused on keeping the Canal open for traffic so that British ships would continue to
use the Canal for the import of vital commodities, like oil, to Britain. The Anglo-French
plan called for all Western pilots working for the Egyptian Canal Authority to walk out.
This would leave the Egyptians with forty pilots out of 165 to operate the Canal. Then the
Anglo-French ships would overwhelm the Canal with traffic forcing the Canal to close.
Harold Watkinson, Minster of Transportation, told the EC that the strategy was to pile-up
a “sufficient” amount of ships at both ends of the Canal to demonstrate Egyptian
incompetence in operating the Canal.156 This, Eden thought, would shutdown the Canal
and force the international community to act. Once the Canal was shutdown, Eden
recommended going to the Security Council to blame Egypt of violating the 1888
Convention for denying the right of passage.157
As that deadline for the walkout approached and the world awaited the outcome,
Western pilots left their post on September 15 without interference. The anticipated
moment came when fifty ships approached the Canal from each end and waited for
transit. The chaos that was planned never materialized. The Egyptian pilots managed to
run the Canal on their own and a record number of ships passed through the Canal that
day. Nasser was ebullient to see his fellow citizens’ accomplish such a feat and declared,
“We have emerged from this experience triumphant.”158 Another pretext had slipped
from Eden’s hands.
With the embarrassing failure of “Operation Pileup”, Eden entertained the Second
London Conference, which met on September 19. Once again, the eighteen nations that
approved the first plan all gathered in London for a dialogue on the Users Association. A
couple of days after intense deliberation, the eighteen nations all agreed that SCUA

46

should manage the Suez Canal. The issue of Canal dues was not settled though. The
British wanted canal dues denied to Egypt and paid to SCUA, but Dulles did not want to
alienate Nasser before presenting the new proposal to him. Disenchanted with SCUA
from the start, the British feared that this would only “crystallize the status quo.”159 Lloyd
talked to Dulles after the conference and found him unwilling to discuss the possibility of
economic pressure. “Economic sanctions would hurt us more than him,” he told Lloyd.
Dulles went on to stress to the Foreign Minster that they could discuss other possibilities
short of war and sanctions.160
Macmillan left for Washington on September 20 to meet with Eisenhower. Dulles
angrily told Macmillan of his disappointment of the French and British decision to go to
the U.N. after they agreed to SCUA. As Macmillan tried to get the U.S. to support Britain
on the issue of canal dues, Dulles disclosed to the Chancellor that the U.S. could not
force shipowners to pay to the Users Association; in addition, the Secretary of State
emphasized that Britain and France were ‘courting disaster” by going to the U.N. and as
to the use of force, Dulles told Macmillan that the U.S. would not hear of it at this
time.161 Macmillan sent a telegram to London stating that they had to act quickly, but did
not mention that the Americans had strong reservation towards going to the U.N.162
Meanwhile, the French decided at the beginning of September not to follow the
American line. As early as September 1, the French decided that their pretext for war
would include Israeli participation. Moshe Dayan received a communiqué from Israel’s
military attaché in Paris that the French wanted Israel to participate in an offensive
operation against Nasser.163 Upon hearing this news David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Prime
Minster, did not share Dayan’s enthusiasm. Because of Eden’s decisions in the past to
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appease Nasser and evacuate the Suez Canal Zone, Ben-Gurion viewed the current crisis
as Eden’s own making. To Ben-Gurion, Eden’s Anglo-Egyptian Base Settlement was an
ill-advised solution; in addition, his vacillation during the current crisis upheld the Israeli
Prime Minster’s belief that Eden could not show resolve when it was needed.164 The
decision by the French to use Israel in an attack on Egypt sounded similar to Macmillan’s
recommendation to the Egypt Committee in late August. During those debates in the EC,
Eden refused to listen to Macmillan’s advice because he did not want to alienate his Arab
allies, but by late September, desperate as pressure mounting from all sides, Eden now
accepted the use of Israel in a military campaign.165
In September and October, the Egypt Committee would not meet as often as it did
in late July and early August. In the fall of 1956, the discussions in the EC mainly dealt
with the topics of U.N. action and military planning against Egypt. The reason that EC
did not convene as often as it did was probably due to the fact of the controversy of
August 24. On the other hand, Eden learned from conversations with Pineau about the
Israeli option and Eden probably wanted to keep this within a closed circle of loyal
ministers—mainly Lloyd, Macmillan and Salisbury. Lloyd was sent to Paris in early
October to compromise on the course to take. The EC was never informed of Eden’s
revised intentions to include Israeli collusion; in fact, from October 17 until November 1
the EC did not convene. During this hiatus, Eden and Lloyd were busy holding talks in
France.
When the Egypt Committee met on October 1, they discussed the approach
Britain would present to the United Nations Security Council, but collusion with Israel
was not mentioned that day. At one point during the conversation the point was brought
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up that if Israel attacked Jordan, Britain was obliged by the Anglo-Jordanian Defense
Treaty to protect Amman, so the EC decided to warn Israel not to attack the Hashemite
Kingdom.166
At a full Cabinet meeting on October 3, Eden revealed that the Israelis intended to
attack the Egyptians, but he stated nothing about collusion with Israel to his Cabinet.
Eden suggested to though that, “the Jews had come up with an offer,” to attack Egypt.167
The Cabinet members agreed that this would give them the pretext they needed to attack
Egypt. When the Egypt Committee met on October 8 to discuss the Israeli option, Eden
was absent and had to be hospitalized due to his illness. Macmillan seemed more
aggressive towards Egypt and the U.S. during Eden’s leave. He demanded that Lloyd
pressure Dulles and Eisenhower to accept that canal payments go to SCUA only.168
Eden and Lloyd arrived in France in late October to find out that the Israelis were
already there. In the Parisian suburb of Sévres, Pineau revealed the invasion plans to the
Israelis. As soon as Ben-Gurion heard that the plan called on Israel to attack Egypt while
Britain and France presented the ultimatum to the belligerents for withdrawal from the
Canal Zone, he refused to let Israel play the antagonistic role while Britain and France
appeared as the peaceful protagonists.169 Moshe Dayan assuaged Ben-Gurion’s fears
though when he announced the strategic boons of the invasion to Israel.170 The tripartite
talks ended with the Sévres Protocol. 171 The tripartite powers agreed that Israel would
start the attack on October 28.
When the Israelis attacked Egypt on Monday, October 29, the U.S. was totally
caught off guard. Since U.S. intelligence reports indicated that Israel was massing troops
on the Jordanian border, Eisenhower expected an Israeli raid on Jordan.172 Eden’s blunder
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was he was still indecisive on what course of action to take at that crucial moment.
Although the invasion fleet was ready to go for sometime in late October, Eden did not
order the invasion fleet to leave Malta until after the Israeli attack hoping to avoid
collusion charges. This would delay the invasion forces a week before they arrived at the
scene.
As the first reports of bombs dropping on Egypt came in, Eisenhower wanted to
go the U.N. to demand an immediate ceasefire. Dulles, unaware yet of the collusion,
proposed an Anglo-French-American sponsored resolution condemning Israel, but the
French and British ignored his invitation. On October 30, the U.S. decided to press the
issue alone in the Security Council. The U.S. presented the resolution condemning Israeli
action. The British and French vetoed the American resolution. When the Soviets
introduced their own resolution and the British and French vetoed this too, Eisenhower’s
fears of Anglo-French participation in the attack were realized. On November 4,
Eisenhower decided to go to the General Assembly to introduce a resolution for a
ceasefire.
By November 4, the Israelis accomplished their mission objectives and were
ready to agree to the ceasefire. That Sunday, Lloyd walked through Carlton Gardens at
Number 10 and found Eden haggard, but calm. In the garden that morning, the two
Ministers reflected on the crisis and the American response. Aware that he could either
accept the U.N. ceasefire or ignore it, Eden told Lloyd that he intended to go in. They
both agreed that the months of preparing all came to this final decision, “we were in
complete agreement that having got this far, it would be wrong to call off the operation,”
Lloyd later said.173
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Two meetings of the EC were held that day one in the afternoon at 12:30 and
another at 3:30 P.M. The first meeting discussed the U.N. resolutions that were presented
that day. On the agenda also was the military operation. Head, who recently visited the
forces in Cyprus, presented a report on Israeli progress. He told the EC that the Egyptian
Air Force was defunct and that the amphibious units were on there way from Malta.
Egyptian forces were retreating to Cairo either because they wanted to take advantage of
Britain’s reluctance to bomb civilian centers or because Nasser felt threatened and needed
the forces for protection.174 At the second EC meeting held at 3:30 P.M. it was reported
that the U.N. wanted Britain’s answer to the ceasefire resolution passed in the General
Assembly that day. Eden’s dilemma was he could comply with the U.N and stop the
invasion force before it arrived or he could continue as planned and face the
consequences. The terms were presented to the EC. Also mentioned was Israel and Egypt
were willing to comply with the ceasefire ordered by the U.N. General Assembly.175
When oil sanctions were mentioned, Macmillan frantically threw up his arms and yelled,
“Oil Sanctions! That finishes it.”176 Once more, the EC was divided, but now its most
hawkish member, Macmillan, became squeamish too.
Carrying signs and chanting to a crescendo against Eden’s belligerence, the
protesters in Trafalgar Squire were heard in the Cabinet room where Eden was presenting
three courses of action to his colleagues.177 He told them that they could either allow the
invasion to take place and turn the Canal Zone over to a U.N. sponsored force after
British troops established themselves; 2) suspend action for twenty-four hours; or 3) give
the combatants time to accept the U.N. ceasefire and call off the whole invasion. The
Cabinet was split, but a majority of the Ministers wanted to go for the first option.
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Monckton was the only member of the Cabinet to choose the third option.178 The AngloFrench invasion began the next day on November 5, 1956.
The denouement of the British Empire was played out on Monday November 5,
1956. In the past few days before the invasion, Eden did everything he could to avoid
contact with the Americans; at the U.N. Lloyd was instructed to ignore American
demands for a ceasefire. Despite public discourse and American indignation, British
paratroopers land in Suez that Monday. Two days later the Egypt Committee convened to
discuss the American outcry at the U.N. and they reviewed the Argentina Resolution,
which called for a ceasefire and a separation of combatants by a U.N. force. The only
drawback to the resolution was that it excluded Anglo-French forces from participating in
the peacekeeping. Speaking to the EC by telephone, Lloyd told his colleagues that their
best choice was to accept the terms in principle, but abstain from voting on the resolution.
They unanimously agreed with the Foreign Secretary’s recommendation.179
Many in the Tory party were perplexed and outraged. They wondered why Eden
would chose to cease combat a few days after the invasion began. Besides, the invasion
force did not meet its objective of taking the Canal. Churchill commenting on the
withdrawal told Head that, “I am not sure I should have dared to start; but I am sure I
should not have dared to stop”180 The spectacle of over one hundred thousand men setting
off for a war which lasted barely a day and then returning has few parallels in the long
gallery of military imbecility. The “grand old Duke of York” at least got up the hill.181
The reason Eden and the EC had a change of heart and decided to cease all
hostilities was due to American financial pressure. Finding themselves ignored by the
British at the U.N., Eisenhower and Dulles decided to hurt Eden and Macmillan were
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they felt it most, their pocketbook. Macmillan was the first to wave the white flag. He
informed Eden that Britain had to borrow money to keep the sterling from losing its
value. As a result, the Bank of England lost $50 million in two days.182 He told Eden that
the run on the sterling would cause the British economy to collapse and the whole
expedition was not worth the cost of the continuing financial loss. Macmillan also
recommended mending relations with the Americans since they needed to borrow money
from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.183
On November 15, Eden asked the Egypt Committee for recommendations to
approaching the Americans. Eden was worried that Americans seemed to show a lack of
concern for the present situation. He pointed out that Eisenhower did not see that the real
threat was the Soviet Union. 184 However, Eisenhower was indifferent to Eden’s feelings.
When Eden decided to ask his colleagues in the immediate days after the conflict was
over whether he should continue in office or leave, they all answered with an astounding
no; Eden’s isolation was complete.185 On January 9, 1957, he resigned. He later wrote
that the U.S. was in part responsible for the failure in Suez. By refusing to aid Britain
during the Suez Crisis, Eden argued, the U.S. threatened to dissolve Western cohesion
and allow the Soviet Union to spread its influence.186
Anthony Eden’s obsession not to let “Nasser get away with it” caused his
downfall. Eden did not understand Arab Nationalism nor did he care about Nasser’s
views on the subject. To Nasser, Eden’s policies embodied a continuation of centuries of
exploitation and occupation by foreign powers.187 Nasser saw an opportunity to rid his
nation of this subjugation and did so in late July of 1956 by nationalizing the Suez Canal.
Eden, wanting to save his nation from being humiliated and becoming a second-rate
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power, tried to prevent Nasser from keeping the Suez Canal and failed. When Nasser
nationalized the Suez Canal in late July of 1956, the newly formed Egypt Committee
engaged in excessive groupthink and that was its undoing. The EC concentrated all its
efforts on a tough military response. The Americans sought a diplomatic solution to the
crisis and tried to force the Eden government to do the same. The Egypt Committee
followed the American course, but this was token diplomacy. This stratagem gave Britain
the time it needed to prepare and fine-tune a military operation, as well as bring France
and Israel into collusion for the military operation. The EC’s failure to act quickly and
decisively and its excessive secrecy not only led to the loss of the United States as a
potential ally in the military response, but also to the decline of British public support for
military action. “Group think” worked in the early weeks of the Suez Crisis; however, as
the crisis dragged on and weeks passed by before a military campaign was staged,
agreement within the EC for the military option also imploded and critics, in the Egypt
Committee, to Eden’s policy began to voice their concerns and doubts for a successful
military campaign; moreover, Eden began to voice their concerns and doubts for a
successful military campaign; moreover, Eden began to vacillate and his iron will to oust
Nasser became uncertain too. As the failure of the invasion of Egypt became a forgone,
conclusion. Eden still went ahead, the invasion failed and weeks after the botched
intervention he resigned as Prime Minister in ignominy. He lost his job and Britain its
prestige as a great power.
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